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DIANA'S LAW, CELEBRITY AND THE
PAPARAZZI: THE CONTINUING
SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION
by

RIcHARD

J.

CURRY, JR.t

It was a week and a half after my heart surgery and I wasn't even
driving. My wife, she was driving the car, and they (paparazzi) cut her
off and told her she couldn't go anywhere, any more and they started
filming. They had to be put in jail because they lost the lawsuit. The
prosecutor went after them and the judge said they were guilty and had
committed a crime.
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Nov. 11, 1998
(on why he sued the tabloids).
There were helicopters buzzing around... my moment wasn't as
peaceful as I thought it would be. We had a decoy bride and groom. We
tried everything... we did what we could with the knowledge that it still
would be intruded upon, but that we did all we could and at least we
could go on from there.
Brooke Shields, May 15, 1997 (describing tactics
taken to avoid paparazzi coverage at her wedding).
There is no doubt that she was looking for a new direction in her
life at this time. She talked endlessly of getting away from England
mainly because of the treatment that she received at the hands of the
newspapers. I don't think she ever understood why her genuinely good
intentions was smeared by the media, why there appeared to be a permanent quest, on their behalf, to bring her down. It is baffling. My own
and only explanation is that genuine goodness is threatening to those at
the opposite end of the moral spectrum. It is a point to remember that
of all the ironies about Diana, perhaps the greatest was this-a girl
given the name of the ancient goddess of hunting was, in the end, the
most hunted person of the modern age.
Charles Spencer, Princess Diana's brother's
remarks about the press at Princess Diana's funeral
said at the Oprah Winfrey Show, May 25, 2000.
t Richard J.Curry is a licensed attorney for years. He graduated from Morehouse
College in Atlanta, Georgia with a B.A. in Political Science in 1985 and obtained a Juris
Doctorate in 1989 from The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. He recently
completed his requirements for his Master of Laws (LL.M) in Information Technolog from
The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois. He is currently employed as a Contract
Specialist negotiating IT agreements at a Fortune 100 company.
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INTRODUCTION

Celebrities and the media possess a unique relationship. Many celebrities skillfully use the media to market and advertise their movies,
television shows, books, and records. They use the media to propel their
careers and create a marketable celebrity image. Society is celebrity
crazed and magazines, tabloids and other media forms such as Entertainment Tonight and Access Hollywood have combined to feed that
craze. Our society's hunger for celebrities has spawned the existence of
photographers known as the paparazzi. Armed with zoom lenses, highpowered microphones, and the promise of huge cash rewards for an exclusive celebrity expose, the paparazzi have become more intrusive and
aggressive than ever in their pursuit of private celebrity information.
The public outcry following the tragic August 1997 death of Princess
Diana and her boyfriend Dodi Fayed as they attempted to out run a
group of aggressive paparazzi has led to a backlash against the
paparazzi and the press.1
Prompted by personal stories from celebrities about aggressive
paparazzi photographers both the State and Federal legislators have in2
troduced legislation to regulate paparazzi conduct.
This Comment focuses on whether anti-paparazzi legislation introduced at the federal level and the State of California laws are necessary
in light of the existing laws. The first section of this paper reviews common law privacy torts. The second and third sections examine proposed
federal legislation and California statue that eradicates intrusive
paparazzi behavior. The fourth section examines the constitutionality of
proposed federal legislation and California law. Finally, this Comment
concludes that these statues are not necessary given existence of laws
that effectively deal with abusive paparazzi behavior.
II.

PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

The common law right of privacy was first articulated in an 1890
article entitled, The Right of Privacy written by Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis. 3 The article criticized the newspaper enterprise for invading the sacred precincts of domestic life. 4 The authors noted that
cameras and other mechanical devices promise to make what is whispered in the closet available to the public, thus, the concept of "the right
1. See Lena Reed VanHoornbeck, Protection From Paparazzi: Possible or Preposterous? 17 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 203, 205 (1997).
2. See Privacy, Technology and the CaliforniaAnti-Paparazzi Statute, HARv. L. REV.
1367, 1368 (1999) [hereinafter Privacy].
3. See Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193;
see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A cmt. A (1977).
4. See id.
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to be let alone" was conceived. 5
Some seventy years later Dean Prosser noted that there were four
common law privacy torts that were actionable against the private sector. 6 The first privacy tort is public disclosure of private facts.7 Under
this privacy tort, "one who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion"8 if: (a)
the personal information is not generally available or visible to the public; (b) the personal information relates to one's private life; and (c) the
disclosure "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." 9
The second privacy tort is publicly placing a person in a false light. 10
Essentially, this tort states:
one who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of ... privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the
[person] had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity
of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed. 11
The third privacy tort is the misappropriation of an individual's
name or likeness for commercial purposes. 12 Under this privacy tort, an
individual's name or likeness must be misappropriated and used in a
13
commercial context without their permission or consent.
The fourth privacy tort is the intrusion upon another's seclusion. 14
Under intrusion upon seclusion, an individual is protected from improper conduct in connection with the gathering of personal information. 15 For a violation to occur under this tort there must be an
intentional intrusion upon a person's solitude or seclusion that would be
construed as highly offensive by a reasonable person. 16 Courts hold al5. See id.
6. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see also Restatement of Torts (Second) § 652A cmt b.
7. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
8. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
9. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D; see also Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in
Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEnGO L. REV. 1153,
1189 (1997).
10. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977).
11. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977); see also Gindin, supra note 9, at
1192.
12. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977).
13. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. b (1977).
14. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
15. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
16. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, cmt. a (1977).
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most universally that this tort cannot occur in a public place. 17 As a
general rule, an individual out in public has no right to be alone and it is
not an intrusion upon privacy should another do no more than follow
another person about their daily activities.1 8 Likewise, there is no intrusion upon that person's seclusion should another individual photograph
that individual in the public place. 19 The rationale being that this
amounts to no more than making a record of the event and this does not
differ from a full written description that anyone in public sight would be
20
free to make.
III.

PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Stressing the national scope of the paparazzi problem, proponents of
21
stricter privacy turned their attention to Congress to enact a solution.
The (late House Representative Sony Bono (R-CA) introduced the first
proposed bill on September 10, 1997.22 Bono's bill, entitled the Protection From Personal Intrusion Act, ("PFPIA") was designed provide protection from personal intrusion for commercial purposes. 23 The bill
established criminal and civil liability for members of the media who engaged in violent behavior such as stalking, harassment, and assault in
an effort to obtain a photograph or recording with the intent to broadcast, publish or sell the photograph or recording. 24 The bill would amend
Chapter 89 of Title 18 of the United States Code, by adding the following:
Definition of 'Harass'-As used in this section, the term harass means
persistently physically following or chasing a victim, in circumstances
where the victim has a reasonable expectation of privacy and has taken
reasonable steps to insure that privacy, for the purpose of capturing by
a camera or sound recording instrument of any type, a visual image,
sound recording or other physical impression
of the victim for profit in
25
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
Under the proposed Bono bill, a defendant would not be allowed to
raise the defense that no image or recording was captured or sold for
17. See Andrew McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of
Liability ForIntrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 989, 1025 (1995).
18. See id; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c (1977).
19. See McClurg, supra note 17, at 1025.
20. See id.
21. See Andrew D. Morton, Much Ado About Newsgathering: Personal Privacy, Law
Enforcement, and the Law of Unintended Consequences for Anti-PaparazziLegislation, 147
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1435, 1450 (1999).
22. See Larysa Pyk, Putting the Brake on Paparazzi: State and Federal Legislation
Propose Privacy Protection Bills, 9 DEPAuL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 187, 195 (1998).
23. See id.
24. 143 Cong. Rec. El 709-01 (September 10, 1997) (Statement of Rep. Bono).
25. H.R. 2448, 105th Cong. (1997).
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profit. 2 6 Moreover, in the event that death resulted from the harassment, a minimum sentence of twenty years could be imposed as well as a
monetary fine. 2 7 If bodily injury results, the defendant faces a minimum
of five years plus a fine. 28 If neither death nor bodily injury occurred
from the defendant's violation, the penalty could result in imprisonment
for a maximum of one year plus a fine. 29 Furthermore, victims would be
allotted a civil action against the defendant. 30 However, no cause of action would exist for the sale, transmission, publication, broadcast, or use
of an image that was made in a lawful manner. 31 Unfortunately, the bill
fails to define what is lawful. Similarly, the bill includes an exemption
for legitimate law enforcement activities, yet fails to provide a definition
for legitimate activities.
Similar to Bono's PFPIA, the Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("PPA"),
proposed by Representative Elton Gallegy (R-CA), contains a similar
harassment definition. Yet, the PPA harassment definition differs from
the PFPIA in that a person is liable for harassment if the image, recording or impression was intended, or attempted to be sold, published, or
transmitted in interstate commerce, or obtained for commercial purposes. 3 2 A commercial purpose is defined as "the expectation of financial
gain or other consideration from the sale or other transfer of the visual
image, sound recording or other physical impression." 33 Like Bono's proposed bill, the PPA allows a person subjected to harassment to file a civil
action against a perpetrator. However, unlike the Bono bill, the PPA
provides the prevailing party an award for reasonable attorney fees and
34
cost resulting from the litigation.
Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) Orin Hatch (R-UT) and Barbara
Boxer (D-CA) introduced the Personal Privacy Protection Act ("PPPA")
on May 20, 1998. 3 5 The PPPA provides enhanced civil and criminal penalties for intrusive newsgathering activities. 3 6 Congressional findings in
support of the Feinstein bill include:
That individuals and their families have been harassed and endangered
by being persistently followed or chased in a way that puts them in reasonable fear of bodily injury, and in danger of serious bodily injury or
even death, by photographers, videographers, and audio recorders at26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Pyk, supra note 22,
id.
id.
id. at 195.
Pyk, supra note 22,
id.
id.
id.
id.
Pyk, supra note 22,
Morton, supra note

at 194.

at 195.

at 195.
21, at 1450.
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tempting to capture images or other reproductions of their private lives
for commercial purposes. That the legitimate privacy interest of individuals and their families have been violated by photographers, videographers, and audio recorders who physically trespass in order to
capture images or other reproductions of their private lives for commercial purposes, or who do so constructively through intrusive modern visual or auditory enhancement devices, such as powerful telephoto lenses
and hyperbolic microphones that permit invasion of private areas that
37
would otherwise be impossible without trespassing.
The proposed Feinstein bill would make it a federal crime to attempt
to photograph or record a person in a way that risks bodily harm. 38 The
penalties under the proposed Feinstein bill are comparable to the penalties imposed under Bono's proposed bill.3 9 Analogous to Bono's and Gallegy's proposed bills, the fact that no image or recording was captured or
40
sold is not a defense against prosecution.
Feinstein's bill defines the term, harass as:
someone who persistently physically follows or chases a person in a
manner that causes the person to have a reasonable fear of bodily injury, in order to capture by, a visual or auditory recording instrument,
any type of image, sound recording
or other physical impression of the
41
person for commercial purposes.
The term commercial purpose is defined as, "the expectation of sale,
42
financial gain or other consideration."
Finally, akin to the Bono and Gallegy proposed bills, there is an exemption for law enforcement activities, yet this bill appears to place
more attention on the privacy protection of private individuals whose
43
misfortunes are captured on tape than in the Bono bill.
A companion to Feinstein's PPPA was introduced on August 5, 1998
by Representative John Conyers (D-Michigan) and Bill McCullom (RFL). 44 The central function of this bill provides protection from personal
intrusion for commercial purposes.4 5 Under Conyers' proposed bill, federal anti-paparazzi legislation would impose criminal and civil penalties
for "reckless endangerment" and civil penalties for "tortious invasion of
46
privacy."
37.
38.
(1999).
39.
40.
41.
42.

S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1997).
See generally Rebecca Roiphe, Anti-Paparazzi Legislation, 36 HARv.J. LEGIS. 250
See id.
See id.
Id.
S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1997)

43. See Pyk, supra note 22, at 196.

44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See H.R. 97, 106 Cong. (1999).
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The first provision, "reckless endangerment," imposes both criminal
and civil penalties on paparazzi photographers and photojournalist who
"persistently follow" their subjects in order to obtain footage for commercial purposes.4 7 Under the bill, if death or serious bodily injury occurs,
an individual can be fined or imprisoned not more than thirty years or
both. 48 Additionally, an individual in violation can be liable in a civil
49
action for appropriate relief.
The second provision, "tortious invasion of privacy" would also create a civil cause of action against those who use visual or audio enhancement devices, such as telephoto lenses or high-powered microphones to
invade upon one's privacy. 50 'Tortious invasion of privacy' is specifically
defined as the 'capture of any type of visual image, sound recording, or
other physical impression of a personal or familial activity through an
auditory enhancement device,' if (a) the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to that activity and (b) the image, recording, or impression could not have been captured without a trespass if not
produced by the use of the enhancement device. 51 None of the proposed
federal bills went before either the House of Representatives or the Senate for a vote as to whether they should become the law.
IV.

CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-PAPARAZZI LAW
52
The nation's first anti-paparazzi statute was passed in California.
The California Civil Code Section 1708.8 holds
[a] person liable for physical invasion of privacy when: (1) the defendant
knowingly entered onto the land of another without permission; (2) [entry is made] with the intent to capture any type of visual image, sound
recording, or other physical impression of [another] engaging in a 'personal or familial activity;' and (3) the physical invasion is [deemed] of53
fensive to a reasonable person.
47. See Randall Boese, Redefining Privacy?Anti-PaparazziLegislation and Freedom of
the Press, 17 SUM COMM. LAW 1,4 (1999); see also H.R. 97, 106th Cong. (1999) § 1 (A) (specifying liability arises against any person who (1) for commercial purposes, (2) persistently
follows or chases a person, (3) in a manner that causes that person to have a reasonable
fear of bodily injury, (4) in order to capture by a visual, or auditory recording instrument
any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of that person).
48. See H.R. 97, 106th Cong. (1999) § 2 (A).
49. See Pyk, supra note 22, at 197.
50. See H.R. 97, 106th Cong. (1999) § 2 (B); see also Boese, supra note 47, at 4 (noting
liability may arise against one who (1) for commercial purposes, (2) engages in a "tortious
invasion of the privacy" of another person, (3) in order to capture by visual or auditory
recording instrument any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of that person).
51. See H.R. 97, 106th Cong. (1999) § 2(C) (2).
52. See generally Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8 (West 1998) (California Governor Pete Wilson
signed into law the first anti-paparazzi statue in September of 1998).
53. Ca. Civ. Code § 1708.8(a) (West 1998).
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The statute further provides that an individual can be held liable for
constructive invasion of privacy where a physical trespass did not occur. 54 The California legislature created the "constructive invasion of
privacy" tort designed to deal with the modern day paparazzi and their
use of high powered technological devices. 55 Under Section 1708.8, a
person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when:
[A] person attempts to capture any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff; though the use of an
enhancement device; while the plaintiff is engaged in a personal or familial activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy; and in a manner that is offensive to a
56
reasonable person.
If either a physical or constructive invasion of privacy occurs, the
individual responsible may be liable for general, special and treble damages. 5 7 Additionally, the individual may be liable for punitive damages. 5 s If it is proven that the invasion of privacy was for commercial
purposes, the remedy is "disgorgement" of any proceeds resulting from
59
violating this section.
California's anti-paparazzi statute also includes a vicarious liability
component. 60 Under the statute, any person who "directs, solicits, actually induces, or actually causes another person [to commit an act of trespass or constructive trespass] regardless of whether there is an
employee-employer relationship [can be held] liable [under Section
1708.8] for general, special, consequential [and in some instances] puni61
tive damages."
Similar to the proposed federal bills, Section 1708.8 also includes an
exemption for law enforcement activities. 6 2 This provision of the statute
holds legitimate:
lawful activit[y] of law enforcement personnel or employees of governmental agencies or other entities, either public or private who, in the
course and scope of their employment, and supported by an articulat[e]
suspicion, capture[s] a visual image, sound recording or other physical
54. See Ca. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) (West 1998) (responding to the use of enhanced
recordings).
55. See Privacy supra note 2, at 1379 (noting the effort to bring back the privacy protection that physical barriers traditionally provided before the advent of high-powered
technological devices).
56. Ca. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) (West 1998).
57. See Boese, supra note 47, at 3 (noting up to three times the amount of any general
and special damages that are proximately caused by violating the statute); see also Cal.
Civ. Code § 1708.8(c) (West 1998).
58. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1708.8(c) and (d) (West 1998).
59. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(c) (West 1998).
60. See Morton, supra note 21, at 1450.
61. Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(c) (West 1998).
62. See Pyk, supra note 22, at 198.
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impression of a person during an investigation, surveillance or monitoring of any conduct to [acquire] evidence of suspected illegal activity, the
suspected violation of any administrative rule or regulation, a suspected fraudulent insurance claim, or any other suspected fraudulent
conduct or activity involving a violation of law or pattern
of business
63
practices adversely affecting the public health or safety.
As stated, it is unclear as to whether police type reality programming would be covered by the aforementioned exemption.
V.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-PAPARAZZI STATUTES

Supporters of anti-paparazzi laws contend that anti-paparazzi statutes do not ban paparazzi photographers from taking pictures of celebrities and public figures. 6 4 Rather, the supporters contend that the antipaparazzi laws simply attempt to impose reasonable standards on the
manner in which paparazzi photographers obtain their photographs of
celebrities and public figures. 65 Additionally, supporters argue that
such regulation on the manner in which paparazzi photographers obtain
photographs serves an important social benefit by protecting the safety
of these individuals and the public.6 6 Although, there is no debate that
these are vital societal interests in light of the well-publicized incidents
over the last two years of celebrities and other public figures being beleaguered by the news media. These statutes go against conventional wisdom that states an individual has no legal recourse against being
photographed in a public place.
The reality is that venturing out onto the street makes an individual
fair game for cameras, regardless of whether those cameras are obvious
and visible, or hidden from the public's view. 67 The reasoning behind
this general rule is that taking a person's photograph in public amounts
to nothing more than making a record of a public sight that anyone present would be free to see. 68 Accordingly, the constitutionality of these
proposed federal bills and the California anti-paparazzi law must be
questioned. Therefore, what are some of the test that the courts will look
at in examining the constitutionality of these statutes.
One test of the constitutionality of anti-paparazzi statutes is the
standard established in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Under O'Brien, when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental inter63. Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(f) (West 1998).
64. See Sharon A. Madere, PaparazziLegislation: Policy Arguments and Legal Analysis in Support of their Constitutionality,46 UCLA L. REV. 1633, 1640 (1999).

65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.
See id.
See Prosser, supra note 6, at 392 (1960).
See id.
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est in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. 69 A governmental regulation is
sufficiently justified under the O'Brien standard if:
it is within the constitutional power of the government;
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no
70
greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest.
In examining the O'Brien standard, there is no dispute that the government has the power if not the duty to enact laws to ensure the health,
safety, welfare and privacy of its citizens. 71 Anti-paparazzi statutes
seem to further important governmental interests in safety and privacy
of citizens. Likewise, it can be argued that this interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression because paparazzi photographers
would still be able to take pictures of celebrities provided such pictures
are taken from a safe distance. Finally, one can argue that the burden
on the expressive conduct of the paparazzi photographer is no greater
than that which is necessary to further an important governmental interest in protecting the safety and privacy of its citizens. Therefore, arguably under the O'Brien standard it would appear that a court could
find that these anti-paparazzi statutes are constitutional,
Another test of their constitutionality is the "Content Neutral Time,
Place or Manner" Test. 72 Under this test, the government is not concerned with the message that is being conveyed. 7 3 The government's
concern under this test is on the method in which the message is being
conveyed. 7 4 A court will apply immediate scrutiny when determining
the constitutionality of a content neutral statute if that statute has an
75
incidental effect on First Amendment rights.
As stated earlier, anti-paparazzi statutes support a significant governmental interest in protecting the safety and privacy of its citizens.
Moreover, while these statutes may leave alternative channels of communication, in that they are solely aimed at harmful or dangerous conduct, the issue is whether these statutes are narrowly tailored to serve
those interests. These statutes broadly apply to all members of the
69. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also Madere, supra note 64,
at p. 1660.
70. See id. at 377.
71. See id.
72. See Madere, supra note 64, at 1661.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1662. To meet this standard, anti-paparazzi statutes must be supported
by a significant government interest; narrowly tailored to serve those interests, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. Id.
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press, as well as to the fan attempting to obtain a picture of a celebrity.
Accordingly, it could be argued that these statutes are not narrowly tailored to its goal of dealing with the abusive paparazzi photographers.
Moreover, these statutes may have unintended consequences, which may
hinder the ability of the media to do investigative reporting on matters of
legitimate public interest that surround public figures.
Additionally, a court can look at these anti-paparazzi statutes to determine whether these statutes are too vague. The United States Supreme Court in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385
(1926), explained that a statute was vague when people of common intelligence have to guess at its meaning. 76 The Connally court held that
vagueness violates due process of law and is therefore unconstitutional.7 7 A statute must be written clear enough to give people the reasonable opportunity to comprehend what the law requires so that they
can ensure that their behavior comports with the statute.7 8 The twoprong test established by the United States Supreme Court for vagueness is:
if the ordinary citizen can understand the intended scope of the law;
and the law contains detailed standards to preclude arbitrary or 79
capricious enforcement, then the law is not unconstitutionally vague.
An examination of the proposed federal anti-paparazzi bills shows
that these bills fail to meet this test. For example, the key phrase "persistently follows" is not defined. Does the phrase refer to the distance
that a paparazzi photographer follows his subject? Does it refer to the
number of days the paparazzi photographer follows his subject? If a
paparazzi photographer follows his subject persistently for a month, is
that sufficient to be in violation of the statute? Or if a paparazzi photographer follows his subject persistently every third day of the month for a
year, does that qualify under the statute as "persistently follows"? Or is
it some combination of the above?
Consequently, the vagueness of the proposed federal anti-paparazzi
statutes makes it tricky for paparazzi photographers and legitimate
news photographers to know what violates the law. It also makes it difficult for those charged with enforcing the statute to know what conduct is
prohibited and whether the law has been violated. Therefore, these bills
fail to draw a clear line between what is unlawful behavior and what
constitutes reasonable newsgathering.
Another test of the constitutionality of anti-paparazzi statutes is
known as the over broad test. Under this test, a law is unconstitutional
76.
77.
78.
79.

See
See
See
See

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
id.; see also Madere, supra note 64, at 1661.
Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
id.
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if it restricts substantially more speech or conduct than is necessary to
accomplish its desired end.8 0 California's anti-paparazzi statute broadly
defines "personal or familial activity" as intimate details of the person's
personal life, interactions with the family or significant others, and other
aspects of the person's private affairs or concerns. Therefore, because
the definition is so broad that the targets of news reports can argue that
almost any activity is private.
The final test of constitutionality was set forth in Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983). In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., the court ruled that Minnesota's enactment of a special use tax applied only to the cost of ink and
paper consumed in the production of newspapers violated the First
Amendment rights of the plaintiff.8 The rationale behind the court's
decision was that a regulation that treats the press differently carries
with it the implicit suggestion that the regulation is based upon a censorial motive.8 2 "Differential treatment, unless justified by some special
characteristic of the press, suggest that the goal is not unrelated to the
suppression of expression, and [as] such [the] goal is presumptively unconstitutional."8 3 The test established in Minneapolis Star would require that anti-paparazzi laws must be based upon a compelling
governmental interest that cannot be achieved without differential
84
treatment.
Since there are other laws aimed at prohibiting the same intrusive
and abusive conduct of the paparazzi photographer such as stalking and
harassment there is no compelling need for these statutes. By enhancing
the enforcement, and in some instances the penalties provided for under
existing laws, it would appear that these existing laws would be able to
provide celebrities with more than enough protection against the
paparazzi. Accordingly, the anti-paparazzi statutes fail to pass the first
prong of the Minneapolis Star test.
As for the second prong of this test, it is irrational to suggest that a
more compelling need exist to prohibit harassment by individuals working for profit than harassment by an overly zealous or obsessive fan.
Consequently, it is likely that these anti-paparazzi statutes would also
fail this prong of the test, which requires that there be a showing that
the compelling interest counterbalances First Amendment concerns cannot be achieved without differential treatment. Consequently, there can
be no debate that the goal of prohibiting stalking, harassment, invasions
80. See Madere, supra note 64, at 1667.
81. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Rev., 460 U.S.
575, 579 (1983).
82. See id. at 588.
83. See id. at 585.
84. See id. at 585-6.
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of privacy, assaults, and batteries can be accomplished without these
anti- paparazzi statutes that unjustly single out the press.
Nevertheless, even if we are to take for granted that these statutes
pass constitutional muster, the question is whether these statutes are
even necessary. Though some would argue that these laws are underutilized, there are state and federal laws that are available to celebrities and other public figures that can be used to deal with aggressive
paparazzi photographers. In short, these anti-paparazzi statutes are not
needed because there are other legal remedies that are available to
celebrities.
VI.

LEGAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE AGAINST THE
OVERZEALOUS PAPARAZZI

There is no debate that paparazzi behavior goes well beyond the limits of decency. However, when paparazzi photographers endanger public
safety or the life of an individual, paparazzi photographers are subject to
the same laws and penalties as any other citizen of the United States.
Accordingly, there are numerous state and federal statutes that celebrities could avail themselves of in dealing with abusive paparazzi
behavior.
Many states have anti-stalking and anti-harassment legislation that
affords celebrities legal remedies against overzealous paparazzi photographers. 8 5 The existence of these laws implies that there is no need for
the anti-paparazzi legislation that has been proposed at the federal level
and passed by the state of California. 6 Furthermore, all states have
common law or statutory prohibitions on harassment, stalking, assault
and reckless behavior.8 7 Since California's enactment of the nation's
first anti-stalking laws, the majority of states have enacted anti-stalking
laws.8 8
In Maryland, stalking is defined as "a malicious course of conduct
that includes ... pursuing another person with intent to place that person in reasonable fear.., of serious bodily injury."8 9 Under Maryland's
stalking statute, a court can impose a fine of $5,000 and a maximum
prison sentence of five years on an individual found guilty of violating
85. See Irene L. Kim, Defending Freedom of Speech: The Unconstitutionalityof AntiPaparazziLegislation, 44 S. D. L. REV. 275, 300 (1999).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Laurie Salame, A National Survey of Stalking Laws: A Legislative Trend
Comes to the Aid of Domestic Violence Victims and Others, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 66, 67
(1993) (noting the two states, Arizona and Maine utilize their harassment and terrorizing
statutes to combat stalking).
89. See Kim, supra note 85, at 301.
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this statute. 90 California's stalking statute provides:
Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent
to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety
of his or her immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a
fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine
91
and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
A person who "commits a second or subsequent violation of this section shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three,
or four years."9 2 In addition, a judge under California statute may issue
a restraining order prohibiting the stalker from contacting the victim for
93
up to ten years.
Another option for celebrities to protect themselves is an injunction
or temporary restraining order (TRO). To obtain a favorable ruling, the
plaintiff must show:
(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial; (2)
the extent to which the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction; (3) the extent to which the defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) the
94
public interest. (citations omitted).
Although states will issue a TRO for a multitude of reasons, the
standard of proof for a TRO's issuance is fairly similar, in that, the movant must prove that "irreparable injury" will result if the court does not
95
grant the relief sought.
The most renowned example of a celebrity utilizing injunctive relief
against a paparazzi photographer is the Galella v. Onassis case. 9 6 In
Galella, a free-lance photographer, filed suit against Jacqueline Onassis
alleging that an earlier restraining order by Mrs. Onassis unreasonably
interfered with his livelihood. 9 7 The district court found the restraining
order to be valid and Galella in contempt because Galella had "insinuated himself into the very fabric of Mrs. Onassis' life and the challenge to
98
this court is to fashion the tool to get him out."
By clear and convincing evidence, the court found that Galella had
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
(1972)).

See id.
Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(a) (West 1998).
Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(c) (West 1998).
See Cal. Penal Code § 646.9(k) (West 1998).
Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1422 (1996).
See Kim, supra note 85, at 306.
See generally Galella v. Onassis, 533 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
See id. at 1077.
See id. at 1108 (quoting Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 210, 216, 228, 231
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violated the TRO on four separate occasions. 99 The first incident occurred on July 21, 1981 at the Hollywood Twin Theatre in Manhattan
when the theatre manager "tipped off' the New York Post that Mrs.
Onassis was at the movie theater.' 0 0 With the assistance of the manager, Galella was able to physically detain Mrs. Onassis for the purpose
of photographing her against her will.1 0 1 The second incident occurred
on September 8, 1981, Galella chased Mrs. Onassis across Menemsha
Pond in Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts.10 2 When her boat stalled,
Galella photographed her against her wishes. 10 3 A third incident occurred on September 7, 1981 when Galella and several associates for the
purpose of taking Mrs. Onassis' daughter's picture ambushed her when
she was biking. 10 4 This was followed by a final incident when Galella
harassed Mrs. Onassis and her friends in the lobby of the Winter Garden
10 5
Theatre in New York City.
The Galella decision is important for three reasons. First, Mrs.
Onassis did not, at anytime, seriously dispute Galella's First Amendment right to photograph her and her children. 10 6 Rather, her concern
was that he adheres to the restrictions the court had previously established.1 0 7 Onassis also did not dispute the fact that a photographer has
the right to gather newsworthy information of official public interest. In
this particular instance, Galella was not acting as "a news photographer
...endeavoring to get a story, accompanied by photographs, of persons
08
who were, and still are, the object of legitimate public interest."
Rather there was no debate thai his actions went far beyond "the reasonable bounds" of normal newsgathering. 10 9 Secondly, the court balanced
the importance of the public's right to observe the day-to-day activities of
Mrs. Onassis and her children against the continuously intrusive surveillance and abusive behavior of Mr. Galella. 1 10 This resulted in the
court disregarding Galella's contentions that the constitutional freedom
of the press protected him from any liability that may arise as a result of
his newsgathering methods. 1 1 1 The court obviously did not find that endangering the lives of Mrs. Onassis or the young Kennedy children justi99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. at 1089.
See Galella, 533 F. Supp. at 1086.
See id. at 1088.
See id. at 1089.
See id.
See Galella, 533 F. Supp. at 1092.
See id. at 1096-97.
See id. at 1105.
See id.
Id. at 1105.
See id.
See Galella, 533 F. Supp. at 1106.
See id.
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fled the aggressive tactics used by Mr. Galella in the exercise of his First
Amendment rights: "Crimes and torts committed in newsgathering are
not protected . . . [t]here is no threat to a free press in requiring its
1 12
agents to act within the law."
Finally, it is also vital to note that the Galella court did not set the
specifications of Mrs. Onassis' TRO as the standard for which all such
injunctions should follow. 113 The opinion is devoid of any language that
would suggest that another public figure or celebrity, in pursuit of their
own injunction against a photographer, would have to be held to the
114
same distances or places as specified in the Onassis restraining order.
Rather it should be noted that these situations would be handled on a
case by case basis. 115 Preliminary injunctions are fact sensitive by nature. Each celebrity will have a different "irreparable injury" than the
next, and each celebrity will not always seek an injunction against the
same paparazzi photographer. 1 16 In addition, depending on the nature
of the dispute, features as minimum 'distances, specific actions by the
plaintiff or defendant, and equipment used will inevitably vary between
different injunctions. 1 7 The court in Galella takes care to ensure that a
court had wide latitude in tailoring TROs. 1 18 Since each movant's situation is unique, the TRO must be uniquely tailored to meet their needs. 11 9
In Galella, the court made sure that the TRO and its enforcement
120
did not infringe upon Galella's constitutional right to free speech.
Galella was still free to photograph Mrs. Onassis and her children but at
a safe distance. 12 1 The court made it a point to permit Mr. Galella to
continue his profession, as long as he did not harm or harass her or her
children. 1 22 This is evidenced when the court struck down a portion of
the originally proposed 1971 order that would have barred Galella "from
appropriating defendant's photograph for advertising or trade purposes
without [her] consent." 12 3 Furthermore, the original 1971 restraining
order, which required Galella to stay 200 and 100 yards between the
12 4
Onassis and Galella; were reduced by the court to 100 and 50 yards.
This decision was clearly an indication that the court recognized
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See id. at 1105.
See id. at 1106.
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See Galella, 533 F. Supp. at 1078.
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See id. at 1107
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See id. at 1079.
Galella, 533 F. Supp. at 1082.
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Galella's First Amendment right to take pictures of Mrs. Onassis and her
family, and went so far as to protect this right in the TRO, while at the
same time permitting the defendant to enjoin the plaintiff.12 5 But
Galella's obvious contempt of the TRO and the danger he imposed upon
Mrs. Onassis and Caroline Kennedy, clearly outweighed his right to photograph them. 1 26 Accordingly, when a paparazzi behavior becomes so
dangerous that it compromises a celebrity's safety, this case clearly indicates that there are laws available to the celebrity to combat intrusions
upon their privacy by paparazzi photographers.
Supporters of anti-paparazzi statute continue to argue that
paparazzi photographers use of high-powered telephonic cameras and
microphones point to the need for anti-paparazzi laws. They insist that
high-powered devices make it unnecessary for a paparazzi photographer
to physically invade the privacy of a celebrity. Although there may be
some validity to their claims, a federal judge recently granted relief to a
harried family against the use of highly sensitive cameras and microphones that the defendant had used to obtain images and conversations.
This relief was granted even though the camera crew remained at all
times on a public waterway adjacent to the property.127
VII.

CONCLUSION

In closing, recent events clearly illustrate that paparazzi photographers are out of control. Anti-paparazzi statutes proposed at the federal
level and enacted by the state of California, while well intentioned are
not needed. There are already laws against stalking and harassment
currently in affect that celebrities can use to effectively deal with
paparazzi photographers who intrude upon their privacy. These laws
have already faced and passed the constitutional challenges that California's anti-paparazzi will soon face.
125. See id. at 1106.
126. See id.
127. See Wolfson v. Wilson, 924 F. Supp. 1413 (April 8, 1996).
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